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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is principally concerned with a subset of Elec-
tronic Health Records (EHRs) known as personal health re-
cords (PHRs).1 As the George W. Bush Administration's na-
tional EHR project lost some of its momentum due to technical
and financial barriers, interest in this more modest, patient-
centric model has grown.2 Mark Rothstein's observation that
"the private sector is racing ahead"3 was confirmed by the
2008 launches of Google Health4 and Microsoft's Health Vault,5
and the considerable press attention they attracted.6
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1. The American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA), a non-profit
membership association for health information management professionals manages myPHR, a
consumer information website, that explains the PHR concept and provides links to (but not
endorsements of) PHR products and services. American Health Information Management
Association, http://www.ahima.org (last visited May 17, 2009); myPHR, http://
www.myPHR.com (last visited May 17, 2009).
2. As this article went to press President Barack Obama signed The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). As discussed below, the
health records financing and privacy provisions in the Act are designed to correct the market
failures and legal disincentives surrounding the adoption of electronic medical records. See
infra Part V.E. Given the timeline for this initiative (records to be available by 2014) and not-
withstanding the "soft" regulation of PHRs contained in the stimulus bill, see infra notes 176-
206 and accompanying text, the new legislation is unlikely to stem the interest in personal
health records.
3. Robert Pear, Warnings Over Privacy of U.S. Health Network, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at
1.22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/washington/18health.html?ex=1187
496000&en=c97a17c072836db0&ei=5070 (quoting Professor Mark Rothstein).
4. Google Health, http://www.google.com/health (last visited May 17, 2009).
5. Health Vault, http://www.healthvault.com (last visited May 17, 2009).
6. See, e.g., Catherine Holahan, Google's Rx for Health Data, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 29, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2008/tc20080229_330594.htm; Craig
Stoltz, Microsoft Health vs. Google Health, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.washing-
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In contrast to the more familiar charts, paper records, and
electronic medical records maintained by health care provid-
ers, PHRs are medical records created and maintained by pa-
tients. Personal health records are defined as "a single, person-
centered system designed to track and support health activities
across one's entire life experience. " PHRs are created by the
patient and stored on the patient's personal computer8 or on a
web site9 provided by the patient's health insurer, health care
provider, or employer,'" the federal government," or even on
an independent, commercial site potentially supported by ad-
vertising.
The development and adoption of health information tech-
nology (HIT)2 was a familiar, if at times lonely, pillar of the
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/10/AR2008031001532.html.
7. THE MARKLE FOUND. CONNECTING FOR HEALTH, THE PERSONAL HEALTH WORKING
GROUP, FINAL REPORT 4 (2003), available at http://www.connectingforhealth.org/ re-
sources/final-phwg.reportl.pdf [hereinafter PERSONAL HEALTH WORKING GROUP].
8. For examples of personal software PHRs, see, e.g., MyPro Health Records Organizer,
http://www.organizedrecords.com/default.asp (last visited Dec. 17, 2008); WakefieldSoft
HealthFile, http://www.wakefieldsoft.com/healthfile/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2008); Health-
Frame Applications, http://www.recordsforliving.com/HealthFrame/Applications/ (last
visited Dec. 17, 2008); Med-InfoChip.com, http://www.medinfochip.com/ (last visited Dec.
17, 2008); Medical ID from MedicAlert, http://www.medicalert.org/home/Homegradi-
ent.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2008).
9. For examples of patient subscription web application PHRs, see, e.g., Ingenix, Informa-
tion is the Lifeblood of Health Care, http://www.ingenix.com/AboutUs/ (last visited Dec.
17, 2008); Press Release, Intuit, UnitedHealthcare, Hewitt Associates, Optima Health and Ex-
ante First to Offer Quicken for Health Care (Apr. 12, 2006), http://web.intuit.com/
about-intuit/press-releases/2006/04-12.html; Medstory, http://www.medstory.com/ (last
visited Dec. 17, 2008); and see generally Caroline McCarthy, Microsoft to Acquire Search Start-up
Medstory, CNET NEWS, Feb. 26, 2007, http://news.com.com/2100-1032_3-6162108.html.
10. Well-known large corporate employers, hospital systems, and health insurers are im-
plementing PHR systems for their employees and patients. See, e.g., myHealthFolders,
https://myhealthfolders.com (last visited Dec. 17, 2008) (web-based health and medical in-
formation system offered by BJC HealthCare System); see also Hospital to Boost Branding with
CD-ROMS for Patients, PHILA. BUS. J., Mar. 28, 2006, http://www.bizjournals.com/philadel-
phia/stories/2006/03/27/dailyl2.html (discussing Thomas Jefferson University Hospital's
program to distribute medical records software to patients).
II. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) launched a pilot program for
South Carolina Medicare beneficiaries in April 2008, using software provided by HealthTrio,
LLC. Press Release, HealthTrio, LLC, HealthTrio, LLC Personal Health Record Chosen for
CMS Pilot for Medicare Beneficiaries (Oct. 15, 2007), http://healthtrio.com/releases/2007/
October_15_2007.html. CMS has now announced additional pilot programs for Arizona and
Utah. Press Release, CMS Office of Pub. Affairs, Medicare Pilot Program Will Offer Benefi-
ciaries Choices for Maintaining Their Own Personal Records (Aug. 8, 2008), https://
www.noridianmedicare.com/phr/pressreleases.htm.
12. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, To HIPAA, a Son: Assessing the Technical, Conceptual, and
Legal Frameworks for Patient Safety Information, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 133 (2005) [hereinafter To
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Bush Administration's second-term health care agenda. For
example, in his 2006 State of the Union address, the President
noted, "[W]e will make wider use of electronic records and
other health information technolog, to help control costs andreduce dangerous medical errors. In 2004 the EHR became
the cornerstone of. the Administration's HIT policy when the
President personally committed to the goal that all Americans
would have electronic health records by 2014.'4
The 2007 and 2008 State of the Union addresses did briefly
mention HIT, but not EHRs."5 Rather, the health proposals in
those speeches attempted to build on a first term initiative, the
HIPAA, a Son]; Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of
Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681 [hereinafter Ensuring Privacy].
13. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006), in Press Release,
Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006),
available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/O1/20060131-10.html.
14. Whitehouse.gov, Transforming Health Care: The President's Health Information Tech-
nology Plan, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/technology/economic-policy2004O4/
chap3.html (last visited May 17, 2009).
The interoperable EHR project was the federal government's third formal foray into e-
health. On August 21, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ti-
tles 26, 29, and 42 of the United States Code) [hereinafter HIPPA]. The "Administrative Sim-
plification" part of HIPAA included authority for the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (DHHS) to develop standards for HIPAA transactions designed to save hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars annually by moving the woefully inefficient U.S. health care system to
paperless transactions. See generally To HIPAA, a Son, supra note 12, at 157-60. During that
process DHHS developed privacy and security protections for patient information used in
HIPAA transactions. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2007). Not all the pieces of the HIPAA regulatory
system were completed when President Bush took office and his administration reduced some
patient privacy protections with a revised regulation. For example, 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2007)
as originally promulgated during the Clinton administration required patient consent for the
even routine use by providers, but the subsequent administration removed this requirement.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 164.506 (2007). The new administration took its own first steps into e-
health by authorizing DHHS to develop e-prescribing standards under the Medicare Prescrip-
tion Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, in part to offset the costs of the Part
D prescription drug benefit. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Moderniza-
tion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of ti-
tle 42 of the United States Code) [hereinafter MMA 2003]; see also Press Release, Office of the
Press Sec'y, State of the Union: Affordable and Accessible Health Care (Jan. 31, 2006), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/O1/20060131-7.html (discussing Presi-
dent Bush's plan to improve health care).
15. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 2007), in Press Release,
Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 2007),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/1/20070123-2.htm; President
George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2008), in Press Release, Office of the
Press Sec'y, President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/1/20080128-13.html.
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authorization of Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) by the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Moderniza-
tion Act of 2003,6 with broad (and apparently stillborn) pro-
posals for the deductibility of health insurance premiums by
individuals. 7 In other words, further endorsement of Con-
sumer-Driven Health Care (CDHC)."8 The PHR narrative is in-
terwoven with CDHC. In part, PHRs are poised to gain trac-
tion because of the numbing financing problems inherent in an
EHR model. Related financing issues are behind CDHC and,
because they are designed to help consumers understand their
own health, and link into published intervention models and
their relative costs, PHRs are a crucial enabling technology for
CDHC. Both PHRs and CDHC paper-over cracks in our
health care and health information technology systems and, in
the absence of fundamental reforms such as single-payer or
some other model of universal care, both shift costs and risks
(albeit different kinds of risks) to patients. This linkage plays
out in the legal domain. There, criticisms leveled at CDHC
can be leveraged to critique PHRs, and the legal risks associ-
ated with PHRs must be added to the list of legal indetermi-
nacies associated with CDHC.
The PHR model is superficially attractive because it seems to
lack the "misaligned incentives," network effects, and other
market failure problems associated with the financing of a na-
tional inter-operative EHR model, 9 while the model's patient-
centricity purportedly avoids the privacy-confidentiality-
security (PCS) externalities inherent in EHRs. In other words,
PHRs are a classic "less-is-more" play.
16. MMA 2003, supra note 14.
17. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2008), supra
note 15 ("The best way to achieve that goal is by expanding consumer choice, not government
control .... So I have proposed ending the bias in the tax code against those who do not get
their health insurance through their employer. This one reform would put private coverage
within reach for millions....").
18. See generally infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
19. See generally David J. Brailer, Interoperability: The Key to the Future Health Care System,
HEALTH AFF., Jan. 19, 2005, at W5-21, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org (In Quick
Search Type "Brailer" and "2005"); Blackford Middleton, W. Ed Hammond, Patricia F. Bren-
nan & Gregory F. Cooper, Accelerating U.S. EHR Adoption: How to Get There From Here, 12 J.
AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS'N 13, 14 (2005), available at http://www.jamia.org/cgi/reprint/
12/1/13 (stating that it is the payor or employer-purchaser of health care services who bene-
fits from the patient safety and quality effects of EHRs because they are at greater risk for a
patient's total health care costs); To HIPAA, a Son, supra note 12, at 171-84; Ensuring Privacy,
supra note 12 at 686 n.20.
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The principal thrust of this Article is that, in this case, "less-
is-worse;" that PHRs are dangerously flawed adjuncts to or
substitutes for provider-centric records, and, while lacking
many of the touted quality or cost-reduction benefits of the of-
ten-criticized EHRs, they pose substantially higher levels of
risk regarding security, privacy, and confidentiality. In a pre-
vious article, Leslie Francis and I detailed the privacy and con-
fidentiality issues inherent in a nationwide interoperable EHR
model and called for enhanced legal protections to precede its
adoption."0 Contrary to their "less-is-more" positioning, PHRs
pose distinct and, in some situations, enhanced risks, requiring
a similarly elevated level of legal protection.
Part II examines the stated benefits of PHRs and counters
with an examination of their potential flaws or, at least, over-
stated benefits from the perspectives of patients and physi-
cians. Part III looks at how such a records paradigm might
impact quality of care and malpractice litigation, and further
examining the linkage between PHRs and CDHC. Part IV
analyzes their privacy-confidentiality-security risks, and Part
V critically examines some possible legal solutions. The con-
clusion is that, as with their technically more complex EHR
sibling, PHRs require a fundamental reworking of the legal
model applicable to all electronic health records.
II. ASPIRATIONS, BARRIERS, AND RISKS
The PHR concept is superficially attractive. It offers a route
towards large-scale deployment of EHRs at a time when the
formal federal government plan seems to be losing some of its
momentum. It avoids the classic market failure model that
dominates health care changes in the United States, appears to
offer a platform upon which information costs associated with
CDHC may be reduced, and by placing control of medical in-
formation in the hands of patients, aims to avoid the PCS (pri-
vacy-confidentiality-security) criticisms leveled at the national,
longitudinal EHR.
Further, the potential for PHRs goes beyond functional re-
placement of a moribund EHR model. PHRs could assert
themselves as distinct from CDHC and engage patients in
their health and wellness. Additionally, there is considerable
20. Ensuring Privacy, supra note 12 at 700-07, 730-35.
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interest in accelerating the availability of health records to out-
comes researchers. Currently, various proprietary and data
protection laws create barriers to such "public good" uses of
patient data.21 If providers establish the value proposition of
patient sharing of their PHR data by, for example, engineering
a feedback loop that facilitates such research flowing back into
immediate improvements in individual patient care, then pa-
tients may indeed have incentives to create accurate, compre-
hensive data sets that would be valued by medical researchers
(an unlikely development).22
In contrast to the financial barriers to EHR adoption, PHRs
potentially enjoy an easier ride.23 First, PHRs are technically
simpler than EHRs. They are not fully interoperable and do
not suffer from the complexity of industrial-strength EHRs or
rely on network effects, whereby incentives to build net-
worked electronic medical records (EMRs) are a function of
the existence of other networked EMRs.24 Second, the incen-
tives to invest in PHR development are well aligned. Experi-
enced IT companies are developing most PHRs with a direct
view to the bottom line (whether by sale or from advertising
revenue) and an identified market. Patients will purchase
PHR services to improve their own health directly, or to better
manage a consumer-directed health environment. Employers
and health insurers will purchase them for patients to try and
reduce their costs by encouraging wellness or facilitating
CDHC. Third, the Bush Administration has cited legal inde-
terminacies (specifically HIPAA's state law savings clause) as
a major barrier to a national EHR. In contrast, PHRs are the
least regulated form of EHRs, most of their iterations existing
in a PCS regulation-free zone.
PHRs are an attractive alternative to the EHR not because
they are superior to an EHR, but because they lack most of the
21. Nicolas P. Terry, Legal Barriers to Realizing the Public Good in Clinical Data, in INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL DATA AS THE BASIC STAPLE OF HEALTH LEARNING: CREATING AND
PROTECTING A PUBLIC GOOD (National Institutes of Health, forthcoming 2009).
22. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Lauran Neergaard, Can PHRs Actually Make You Healthier? SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2008/02/04/
national/w120944S71.DTL (noting barriers to EMRs' adoption as driver of PHRs).
24. See generally S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externalities (Effects) (un-
published article), available at http://www.pub.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/palgrave/net-
work.html (explaining that the benefit that can be derived from an item in a network depends
on the amount of similar items using that same network).
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provider-incurred costs associated with the deployment of the
latter. With a PHR model, those costs and risks are shifted to
patients. That shift may turn out to be a bad bargain for both
patients and their doctors. In this Section, I examine the main-
stream operational risks and benefits of PHRs from the per-
spectives of patients and physicians.
According to the Markle Foundation, PHRs have several dis-
tinctive, and impliedly positive, features:
* Each person controls his or her own PHR. Indi-
viduals decide which parts of their PHR can be ac-
cessed, by whom and for how long.
* PHRs contain information from one's entire life-
time.
* PHRs contain information from all health care pro-
viders.
• PHRs are accessible from any place at any time.
* PHRs are "transparent." Individuals can see who
entered each piece of data, where it was transferred
from and who has viewed it.
* PHRs permit easy exchange of information with
other health information systems and health profes-
sionals.25
For the analysis that follows, these properties are grouped
into sets of features (A. Patient Control, Access, and Transpar-
ency, and B. Completeness and Interoperability) that are criti-
cally observed from the perspectives of patients and provid-
ers.
A. Patient Control, Access, and Transparency
With the possible exception of data access or storage being
out of control of the patient if a web-based storage system is
temporarily (for example, because of network problems) or
permanently (for example, the site going out of business) un-
available, a PHR model does indeed suggest patient control,
25. PERSONAL HEALTH WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 4.
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access, and transparency. After all, the patient truly is his or
her own data custodian. The fundamental practical flaw in
this construct, however, is the assumption that a PHR's value
is primarily related to its existence in a patient-controlled silo.
No doubt, some patients will construct a limited "silo" data-
base containing, say, lists of medications, account numbers,
and providers; data that is never shared outside the patient's
own computer. However, the real value of any electronic re-
cord, whether personal or .not, is in the interoperability of the
data. For the patient, that inevitably means acquiring data
from or sharing self-generated data with a health care pro-
vider, insurer, or pharmacy. Once that decision to share has
been made, the control, access, and transparency properties
are seriously compromised.
Doctors own the medical records they keep about patients.26
State statutes have extended that default position to hospital
records.27 HIPAA sought to be agnostic on the issue, purport-
ing to govern only use and disclosure of records.28 The Ameri-
can Medical Association (AMA) has taken the position that
their members should seek to monetize records data.29 Indeed,
a member of the AMA board of trustees has noted that, "there
is tremendous economic value to the cumulative data in terms
of analyzing patterns," and suggested that control of such data
is central to doctors having influence on pay-for-performance
programs.3" Given this background, who will own PHR
26. See, e.g., Waldron v. Ball Corp., 619 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Regens-
dorfer v. Orange Reg'l Med. Ctr., 799 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 456.057(2) (West 2007) (including "health care practitioner" in definition of "re-
cords owner" but excluding, for example, nursing assistants and nursing homes); Am. Med.
Ass'n, E-7.04 Sale of a Medical Practice, available at http://www.cobar.org/
docs/AMA%20(Professionalism) %20E-7.pdf?ID=2373 (discussing conditions for transfer of
patient records when selling a medical practice).
27. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-304(a)(1) (West. Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
456.057 (West 2007).
28. Final Rule, Standards for the Privacy and Individually Identifiable Health Information,
67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2007)) (Comment and
(HHS) Response, Preamble to the HIPAA Privacy Rule); see also TRUST in Health Information
Act of 2008, H.R. 5442, 110th Cong. § 101-02 (2008) (requiring healthcare providers to obtain
informed consent from patients before releasing any medical information to third parties).
29. See Kevin B. O'Reilly, AMA to Set Guidelines on Control of Record Data, AMNews, Nov.
28, 2005, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/11/28/bisbll28.htm.
30. Id. (quoting Dr. William A. Hazel, Jr., a member of the AMA's Board of Trustees). Pay
for Performance (or P4P) initiatives are programs that encourage improved quality of care
with financial incentives. See, e.g., Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medi-
care "Pay For Performance (P4P)" Initiatives, (Jan. 31, 2005), available at
20091
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data-the patient, the PHR service, or the physician whose ser-
vices the recorded data relates to? Absent some contractual
claim by the PHR service, the patient's ownership of the data
seems clear.' The problem arises when the patient uploads
some or all of his PHR to a physician's EMR. At this point the
physician arguably owns this copy of the transferred data.
3 2
Physicians may be unwilling to electronically share (down-
load) their records into PHRs, particularly if a third-party web
host is seeking to monetize the data. Certainly physicians will
not cede control over patient-generated data that they have
downloaded into their own patient record system. The patient
may have a right of access to33 and correction of34 data held by
a physician under HIPAA or state law,35 but that falls well
short of "control." Financial institutions see the data sharing
inherent in online banking as a marketable "value-add" and as
a way of reducing the costs of paper statements and bricks-
and-mortar services, but will doctors and their professional
organizations see similar benefits?
Practical concerns also intrude. To what extent will patients'
requests to download physician-generated data to their PHRs,
or to have their own data uploaded to physician EMRs fit the
business model of the average doctor's practice? Is this some-
thing that the physician will do personally when the patient
walks in with a flash drive? Will the time spent performing an
upload and/or synchronization ever be reimbursable? In-
deed, will doctors charge a separate fee for the requested ac-
commodation in much the same way they are permitted to
under HIPAA's access rule36 and similar state laws?3"
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ apps/ media/ press/ release.asp?Counter=1343; infra text accom-
panying note 59.
31. Cf. Securamed, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.securamed.com/support-
english.med (last visited Dec. 23, 2008) ("Who owns my health record?") (stating explicitly
that the data is owned by the patient).
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.057(1) (West 2007) (including in definition of "records
owner," "any health care practitioner to whom records are transferred by a previous records
owner"). At this point the physician arguably has ownership rights over the downloaded
copy of the patient's data.
33. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2007).
34. 45 C.F.R. § 164.526 (2007).
35. See, e.g., Patient Access to Health Records, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123100 to
123149.5 (West 2006).
36. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(4) (2007).
37. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.3025 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-8404 (2003).
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B. Completeness and Interoperability
The assertion that a PHR contains information about an en-
tire lifetime and from all health care providers is aspirational,
not factual. It is theoretically possible that a patient-centric re-
cord could have the same data as a provider-centric longitudi-
nal record, but highly unlikely unless such data was
downloaded from a mature, interoperable EHR. Rather, a
PHR will only contain the data that the patient is prepared to
input or that can be inputted automatically from providers' re-
cords.
Doctors are subject to detailed statutory38 and common law
compulsions39 to keep complete and current records, while
federal rules4" and state statutes4' are explicit as to how long
such records must be retained. It is unclear whether patients'
economic or health self-interest will supply anything like the
same incentives.42 The professional responsibility is also long-
term. Skepticism is surely merited as to whether patients will
show the same diligence throughout an "entire lifetime" or
with regard to their relationships with "all health care provid-
ers." 4
3
It is known that patients routinely lie to their doctors.44 Will
they be more honest when recording their own health infor-
38. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. § 61-6-15(D) (2008) ("'Unprofessional or dishonorable conduct' ..
includes . . .(33) improper management of medical records, including failure to maintain
timely, accurate, legible and complete medical records ... ").
39. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D.D.C. 1987) (keeping inade-
quate summary records may constitute malpractice).
40. See, e.g., Condition of Participation: Medical Record Services, 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(b)(1)
(2007) ("Medical records must be retained in their original or legally reproduced form for a
period of at least 5 years .... ).
41. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2144(F) (2008) (ten years for "Hospital records");
N.M. STAT. § 14-6-2 (2003) (ten years for "all records directly relating to the care and treatment
of a patient").
42. There are some reports critical of physician practices regarding data entry in EMRs.
See, e.g., Pamela Hartzband & Jerome Groopman, Off the Record - Avoiding the Pitfalls of Going
Electronic, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1656, 1656-58 (2008).
43. PERSONAL HEALTH WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 4; see also Robert Steinbrook, Per-
sonally Controlled Online Health Data - The Next Big Thing in Medical Care? 358 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1653, 1655 (2008) (stating that many physicians are wary of increased liability for "in-
complete, inaccurate, or difficult to verify" information in personally controlled electronic
health records).
44. See, e.g., Doctors: Patients Who Lie Can be in Danger, CBS2 CHICAGO, Jan. 20, 2007,
http://cbs2chicago.com/health/patients.lying.doctor.2.334683.html; Patients Lie to Doctors-
And Suffer for It, MSNBC, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17188153/.
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mation? Will cognitive dissonance or apprehension that an-
other family member might see data on a home computer (or
employer or co-worker if on an office machine) result in a se-
lective or edited record? If the PHR is limited to medical ex-
penses and a record of prescription medicines then such issues
may not arise (transcription errors aside). Beyond that, pa-
tients' lack of technical acumen and medical illiteracy may
pose greater problems than honesty, as patients struggle to
collect and code (even using "simple" drop-down choices)
data.
In practice, patient-created or maintained records will be in-
complete and likely inaccurate. At best, they will provide a
somewhat distorted "snapshot" or summary record. (In Aus-
tralia, the summary limitation of the HealthConnect record was
in part responsible for the system's demise.)45
The sharing or exchange of data between PHRs and provid-
ers or their EMRs is as speculative as it is controversial. The
potential for realistic interoperability between PHRs and phy-• 46
sician-owned EMRs is unproven. Even assuming that PHRs
and EMRs are able to interoperate at some level it is unclear
whether that interoperability will have the sophistication (e.g.,
semantic transparency) or granularity (e.g., specificity of cod-
ing) promised by the national EHR project.
Again, the current culture of the physician-patient relation-
ship must be taken into account. It is not difficult to appreci-
ate the kind of dread that a physician must experience when a
45. See Tracy D. Gunter & Nicolas P. Terry, The Emergence of National Electronic Health Re-
cord Architectures in the United States and Australia: Models, Costs, and Questions, 7 J. MED.
INTERNET RES. e3 (2005), available at http://www.jmir.org/2005/1/e3/HTML; see also David
More, Health Connect is Dead-So Now V/hat?, CENTRE FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT, Feb. 1, 2006,
http://cpd.org.au/article/health-connect-dead-so-now-what%3F.
46. So far the most successful initiative regarding such PHR/EMR interconnectivity has
been the ASTM/HL7 concord. See generally AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS' CTR. FOR
HEALTH INFO. TECH., ESSENTIAL SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE HL7 CDA/CRS
AND ASTM CCR 4 (2005), available at http://www.centerforhit.org/PreBuilt/chit-ccrhl7.pdf
("HL7 and ASTM have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in place to coordinate ef-
forts to har-monize the CDA and CCR."). Apparently, there was some friction between
ASTM (CCR) and HL7 (with its CDA) as to whether these were competing standards. Jack
Beaudoin, ASTM, HL7 Struggling to Get Along, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS, Aug. 18, 2004, http://
www.healthcareitnews.com/news/astm-hl7-struggling-get-along. However, by 2007 the two
organizations had harmonized CCR and CDA into a single standard, known as the "Con-
tinuity of Care Document" (CCD). Press Release, Health Level 7, Inc. and ASTM Inter-
national, HL7 Continuity of Care Document, a Healthcare IT Interoperability Standard, is Ap-
proved by Balloting Process and Endorsed by Healthcare IT Standards Panel (Feb. 12, 2007),
available at http:/ /www.h17.org/documentcenter/public/pressreleases/20070212.pdf.
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patient walks into his consulting room armed with a sheaf of
printouts from Internet medical advice and pharmaceutical
marketing web sites.47 Will the PHR-equipped patient now
begin that encounter by presenting his or her "record"? Will
the physician see this as an opportunity to work with a well-
informed patient vested in shared responsibility for his or her
health care, or view it as another indication of the deteriora-
tion of professional hegemony as patients, health care institu-
tions, and commercial entities struggle to become the domi-
nant players in the health care encounter?
Finally, given the overall patient-centricity value proposition
of the PHR, we must acknowledge again its greatest medico-
legal Achilles' heel. Most of the important patient-centric at-
tributes of the PHR (control, access, and privacy) assume that
the PHR data will remain in a patient-controlled silo. Yet, as
soon as the data is shared with a physician it is no more "per-
sonal" or personally controlled than any other piece of verbal
or written data put in the hands of the physician. Once it is
absorbed into the doctor's EMR, the data (or at least that copy
or version) is no longer practically or legally in the patient's
control.
In the next three Parts, I place these patient and physician
concerns in a legal frame, looking first at quality risks and
quality of care litigation issues, and then PHR privacy-confi-
dentiality-security risks, and some potential solutions.
III. SHIFTING QUALITY RISKS; CHANGING LIABILITY MODELS
As follows from the above discussion, the PHR model in-
volves patients incurring some medical records costs. This is
not a simple shift of costs from health care providers to pa-
tients; after all, providers will still keep their own EMRs.
Notwithstanding, the more ambitious scheme of EHR interop-
erability founders, PHR substitution will (near-term at least)
shift costs to patients. "Cost" is not a simple concept in this
context. Some patients will no doubt purchase PHR software
47. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontibres (or How I Stopped Worrying
About Viagra on the Web but Grew Concerned About the Future of Healthcare Delivery), 4 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcS 183 (2004) (describing how the Internet has transformed the pre-
scribing and dispensing of medications to patients, and arguing that a careful balance must be
struck between regulating web-based prescription services and supporting greater autonomy
for consumers to knowledgeably control their own healthcare).
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or a PHR web subscription, but most will be provided with
"free" PHRs. Many of these will be explicitly advertiser-
supported or financed by leveraging the patient's hosted data
in some other way. Finally, patients supplied with PHRs by
employers or insurers may incur distinct PCS costs. However,
the potential patient and, as will be seen, provider-incurred
costs discussed in this section are of a different character.
How will the implementation of PHRs affect, negatively or
positively, the quality of the patient's care? And, how might
PHRs influence the nature or quality of care litigation?
A. PHRs and Health Quality
There are several avowed, quality-related reasons for invest-
ing in a wide-scale (e.g., regional or national) interoperable
EHR. Such systems have the potential to enable related qual-
ity-improving and error-reducing technologies such as CPOE
(computerized physician order entry), CDSS (clinical decision
support system), and other surveillance systems, facilitate ac-
curate and legible communication among providers, automate
adverse event and medical error disclosure, and provide for
reliable and reproducible outcomes research and reporting.48
EHRs, therefore, are designed to produce both individual
health and population-wide improvements to the quality of
health care.
In contrast, PHR contribution to the health of the individual
patient keeping the record is difficult to evaluate. Clearly it
will not have the impact of EHR data in a mature HIT envi-
ronment where EHR data will be integrated into a provider's
CDSS and surveillance systems.49 Nevertheless, a reasonable
PHR should have some "wellness" benefits and is likely to
have some "alarm" settings for dosages and interactions of
currently prescribed drugs.
48. See generally Gunter & Terry, supra note 45 (evaluating the benefits and challenges of
two proposed national electronic health record models (American and Australian), and the
various ways centralized and systematized data will transform the nature of medical records
collection and storage); see also Access To Electronic Medical Records Significantly Increases Effi-
ciency of Emergency Care, SCIENCEDAILY, May 30, 2008, http://www.sciencedaily.com/re-
leases/2008/05/080530074313.htm (discussing reduction in costs in treating emergency room
patients with EMRs by, for example, avoiding extraneous medical tests).
49. See generally To HIPAA, a Son, supra note 12, at 138-47 (stating how hospitals and other
in-patient care facilities will utilize "tracking" and "tracing" technologies to monitor every de-
tail of a patient's condition while inside the health care facility).
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However, it is unclear how PHRs can serve any population-
wide or public health law goals. Indeed, their patient-centric
value proposition seems antithetical to any public benefit. No
doubt some PHR-generated data will escape into public or
private research domains; some PHR providers may simply
sell patient data to researchers while the more careful and
ethical ones will navigate the limited PCS issues with contrac-
tual consents or sell only de-identified data. And, of course,
PHR data that is absorbed into an EMR will be treated as any
other research data, subject to known PCS constraints. Over-
all, however, data held exclusively in PHRs will have only a
marginal impact on health outcomes research or epidemiol-
ogical studies."
B. Consumer-Directed Health Care
The PHR narrative is inextricably linked to proposals for
consumer-directed health care. The first linkage is economic
because the same fundamental health care financing problems
(market failures, misaligned incentives, etc.) underlie both
proposals. The second link is that CDHC is heavily reliant on
major decreases in consumer information costs. PHRs con-
taining individual health data and linking out to generalized
wellness and treatment information may play a crucial ena-
bling role for CDHC. As a result, criticisms leveled at CDHC
provide an additional stick with which to beat its new fellow
traveler, while the specific practical and legal problems associ-
ated with PHRs (issues that go beyond concerns about EHRs)
cast additional critical light on CDHC.
The components of CDHC are as well-known, as they are
complex and controversial." "Consumer-directed health
50. Some have argued further that empowering patients to control and maintain their lon-
gitudinal records will result in an injurious shift of patient data from academic research insti-
tutions to companies new to the health care enterprise. See Kenneth D. Mandl & Isaac S. Ko-
hane, Tectonic Shifts in the Health Information Economy, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1732, 1732-37
(2008).
51. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-
DRIVEN MOVEMENT 17-26, 119-49 (Duke Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE AT RISK];
see also Mark A. Hall & Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving Managed Care with Health Savings Ac-
counts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1492 (2005) ("Despite ... question marks, the strategy of causing
consumers to set aside assets for spending on their own health care should inspire at least
some economizing behavior of the sort that has been systematically missing with compre-
hensive first-dollar coverage. It may also help increase patients' awareness that medical care
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plans" (CDHPs), that couple catastrophic insurance coverage
with large deductibles, are designed to replace traditional em-
ployer-funded health insurance.12  Consumers, out of their
own tax-sheltered health savings accounts, will pay for non-
catastrophic costs.53 The newly empowered patient as con-
sumer, so we are told, will hungrily and efficiently seek out
health quality data available on federal 4 and state web sites55
prior to selecting a provider, accept more personal responsibil-
ity for his or her health and health care, rely more on health in-
formation from commercial1 6 or provider web sites,57 and
maintain his or her own personal health record. 8 Faced with
such informed and empowered consumers, providers will
have to compete on both price and quality while receiving ad-
ditional "market-leading" incentives from pay-for-perform-
ance (P4P) programs instituted by managed care organizations
and the federal government. 9 CDHC is designed to move
health care costs to patients in order to reduce health care con-
sumption (and moral hazard issues) and with the hope that
costs real money and thus diminish the extreme entitlement mentality that affects most peo-
ple's attitudes toward health care.").
52. See UNITED STATES GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH
PLANS: SMALL BUT GROWING ENROLLMENT FUELED BY RISING COST OF HEALTH CARE COVERAGE
2 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06514.pdf.
53. A related proposal was President Bush's 2007 State of the Union tax deduction pro-
posal to tax workers for their health benefits, but provide a health insurance deduction for any
individuals with health insurance. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, su-
pra note 15. This plan, which seems to have garnered little political traction, has been criti-
cized as a tax benefit for the wealthy, as ineffective to reduce the number of uninsured (few of
whom have any tax liability), and likely to erode employer-provided health care insurance.
See, e.g., Karen Davis, The 2007 State of the Union Address: The President's Health Insurance Pro-
posal Is Not a Solution, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.common-
wealthfund.org/Content/From-the-President/2007/The-2007-State-of-the-Union-Address--
The-Presidents-Health-Insurance-Proposal-Is-Not-a-Solution.aspx.
54. E.g., Medicare, Nursing Home Compare, http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
55. E.g., Virginia.gov, Virginia Board of Medicine Practitioner Information, http://www.
vahealthprovider.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
56. Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybermedicine, 25 AM. J.L. & MED.
327, 327-66 (1999).
57. Milt Freudenheim, AOL Founder Hopes to Build New Giant Among a Bevy of Health Care
Web Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at C1.
58. See generally Gunter & Terry, supra note 45 (describing personal EHRs); Ensuring Pri-
vacy, supra note 12, at 681-735 (discussing that a nationwide electronic health record system
"must embrace an autonomy-based, default position of full patient control over personal in-
formation, with very limited exceptions.").
59. See, e.g., Medicare "Pay For Performance (P4P)" Initiatives, supra note 30.
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market forces will drive down health care costs so that it be-
comes affordable for the 47 million uninsured Americans. 0
For CDHC to evolve from a slogan concealing additional
cost and risk-shifting to patients, into a new paradigm of ra-
tional health care consumption, requires a radical reduction in
patient-incurred information costs. The CDHC model as-
sumes that most consumer information will be sourced from
providers and that this will be supplemented by information
from government and commercial web sites.61 The barriers to
reductions in patient information costs are numerous. Many,
if not most, patients suffer from medical and economic illiter-
acy.62 As more information is provided to them they will incur
significant sorting costs. Further, there are major practical bar-
riers to any type of information processing during times of cri-
sis, such as during an emergency admission.
PHR data likely will function as a source of patient informa-
tion. The process of maintaining a PHR could engage the pa-
tient more fully in his health care status. Some PHRs will link
rich data to patient-reported conditions or physician-reported
diagnoses. At some level, therefore, PHRs potentially will en-
able CDHC. What is unknown, at the present, is whether
PHRs will reduce information costs and make CDHC more
workable or whether PHRs will operate as a type of Trojan
horse, falsely convincing consumers that they are in charge of
their health care and so making CDHC more palatable.
60. See, e.g., STAN DORN, URBAN INST., UNINSURED AND DYING BECAUSE OF IT: UPDATING
THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE ANALYSIS ON THE IMPACT OF UNINSURANCE ON MORTALITY 2-3
(2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411588-uninsured-dying.pdf (es-
timating excess mortality due to lack of insurance at 137,000 people from 2000-2006 and ap-
proximately 22,000-27,000 people in 2006).
61. See CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS, supra note 52, at 2.
62. See, e.g., SHEIDA WHITE, AM. MED. ASS'N FOUND., ASSESSING THE NATION'S HEALTH
LITERACY: KEY CONCEPTS AND FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY
(NAAL) 43 (2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/367/
hlre-port_2008.pdf (discussing how more than one-fifth of adults have a basic or below level
of health literacy); INST. OF MED., HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END CONFUSION 2
(2004) ("Forty million Americans cannot read complex texts ... at all, and 90 million have dif-
ficulty understanding complex texts. Yet a great deal of health information, from insurance
forms to advertising, contains complex text."); AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH &
QUALITY, LITERACY AND HEALTH OUTCOMES 1 (2004), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/
clinic/epcsums/litsum.pdf ("Low literacy is common in the United States; a decade ago, 40
million adult Americans scored on the lowest of five levels (level 1) of the National Adult Lit-
eracy Survey (NALS); another 50 million scored at level 2.").
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C. Liability Indeterminacies and CDHC
Our traditional health care liability systems are premised on
a financing-agnostic model. That is, the financing of a medical
procedure generally is insulated from the liability rules that
assess any resulting adverse events and influence its quality.
This is true regarding both the custom (physician-centric)
standard of care in diagnosis or treatment cases63 and the ex-
pectations (patient-centric) standard used by a slight minority
of jurisdictions in informed consent cases.64 Courts have gen-
erally brushed back theories of liability where patients have
sought to intermingle their personal financial situations with
medical decision-making.65 While, shamefully, lack of insur-
ance may justify a provider refusing to treat a patient at all,
66
the courts have taken the position that, once there is a physi-
cian-patient relationship, treatment must be rendered regard-
less of financing concerns.67 Of course, the numbingly com-
plex managed care ERISA 68 litigation that began in the mid-
1990s put a related issue front and center as patients brought
63. See generally Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 560-65 (D.C. 1979); Hall v. Hilbun,
466 So. 2d 856, 870 (Miss. 1985); Morgan v. McPhail, 672 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
64. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("True consent to what
happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to
evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each. The average
patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physi-
cian to whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision. From
these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in turn the requirement, of a rea-
sonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such a decision possible."), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972).
65. See, e.g., Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 608 (Cal. 1993) (holding that informed consent
duty owed to cancer patient did not include a duty to advise patient of risks of failing to put
his estate into good order).
66. See, e.g., Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 157 So. 224, 225 (1934); see also Childs v.
Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. App. 1969).
67. See, e.g., Muse v. Charter Hosp., 452 S.E.2d 589, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); see also Wick-
line v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("a physician who complies without
protest with the limitations imposed by a third payor, when his medical judgment dictates
otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's care."); Ricks v. Budge, 64
P.2d 208, 211-12 (Utah 1937) (discussing physician's on-going duties following treatment).
Also noteworthy is The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),
42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000), which requires Medicare-participating hospitals to offer emergency
services to "provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of
the hospital's emergency department," and can lead to duties to stabilize. EMTALA protects
against discriminatory treatment of uninsured or impecunious patients. See generally Morgan
v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Ala. 2006).
68. Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
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legal challenges to the coverage decisions of managed care en-
tities.6 9 However, the basic proposition of cost/financing ag-
nosticism survived the "ERISA decade;" once treatment has
been undertaken, a dispute over the quality of care is a sepa-
rate, non-ERISA issue.
What, however, will be the response of the courts to quality
of care issues when the patient is financing some or all of his
own care (e.g., paying for it from an HSA) and, as a result, in-
evitably making decisions that will relate to the quantity or
quality of care? Haavi Morreim has argued that the courts
will be faced with actions premised on informed consent theo-
ries that allege failure to adequately warn of the cost of proce-
dures; while providers will make increased use of affirmative
defenses, such as assumption of risk and comparative negli-
gence, against patients whose own financial decisions influ-
enced the mode of treatment.7' Certainly some jurisdictions
have extended the risk-disclosure duty to cover situations
where the patient refuses treatment, 72 suggesting the need for
a complex dialogue between the frugal patient and the ethi-
cally and legally constrained physician. Affirmative defenses,
on the other hand, may not be as readily applicable. Courts
have stepped up their pressure on patients to cooperate with
their treating physicians and obey post-treatment instructions.
As noted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey:
[O]nce the patient comes under the physician's care,
the law can justly expect the patient to cooperate with
the health care provider in their mutual interests ...
[and] it is not unfair to expect a patient to help avoid
the consequences of the condition for which the physi-
cian is treating her.73
69. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); Rush v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
70. See generally, e.g., Petrovitch v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999)
(Patient brought suit against HMO, alleging that it was vicariously liable for the conduct of
her participating treating physician after cancer treatment was already undertaken. The suit
was not brought under ERISA, and the court found that an HMO can be held vicariously li-
able for the negligence of physicians.).
71. E. Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort
and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207,1207-61 (2006).
72. See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906 (Cal. 1980) (holding that a physician is
obligated to provide his patient with all information material to her decision to refuse a pap
smear).
73. Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 156 (N.J. 1988).
2009]
DREXEL LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 1:216
However, these mitigation or "avoidable consequences"
types of cases aside, the courts have tended to reject affirma-
tive defenses based on pre-treatment conduct or circumstances
in large part because the physician must treat the patient as he
presents.74 Given the informational asymmetry between pa-
tient and provider, the subjective standards traditionally ap-
plied to the affirmative defense inquiry, and sometimes-
applicable duties to treat notwithstanding lack of insurance,
75
courts may not be eager to penalize patients because of their
financial circumstances or any treatment decision "they"
made.
Notwithstanding, Peter Jacobson and Michael Tunick have
argued, "it seems likely that legal doctrine will evolve in ways
that permit physicians to take costs into account without vul-
nerability to medical liability."76 However, they also predict
novel areas of provider exposure; for example, the supply of
inaccurate or outdated cost and quality information to pa-
tients.77 Finally, Timothy Jost weighs in with an appropriate
summary: "All that can be said for certain is that the relation-
ship between patients and providers will change in ways that
are not now fully predictable and that professionals and pa-
tients may not like."78
D. Adding PHRs to the Legal Mix
This growing literature concerning the legal indeterminacies
of CDHC can be downloaded into the PHR debate. PHRs not
only enable CDHC, but also involve their own, additional
level of privatization of health care (the shifting of records
burdens and risks from government, employers, and provid-
ers to individuals).
A provider-centric liability model is premised on physician-
held patient data. In exploring the rationale for privacy and
confidentiality I have noted the traditional, albeit tacit, under-
74. Id. at 152. See also Bryant v. Calantone, 669 A.2d 286, 289 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996).
75. E.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(2006).
76. Peter D. Jacobson & Michael R. Tunick, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Courts:
Let the Buyer (and Seller) Beware, 26 HEALTH AFF. 704, 708 (2007).
77. Id. at 710.
78. HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 51, at 160.
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standing providers and patients have regarding the provider
being the sole custodian of medical information: "patients
provide information to physicians in the belief that it will fur-
ther their diagnosis and treatment while physicians respect
confidences in order to encourage patients to disclose personal
and medical information that will make diagnosis and treat-
ment more effective."79 However, the PHR model disrupts
this understanding. Two "sets of books" will be kept, the pa-
tient's PHR, and the doctor's records (whether electronic or
not). Will they contain the same information? Will the pa-
tient, now the guardian of his own medical information, dis-
close his entire PHR? If so, will the physician be able to cope
with the sorting costs of being presented with a voluminous,
parallel personal record? Will the standard of care be adjusted
to allow for physician reliance on patient-entered data? And
will the physician be under a duty to "return the favor" and
add "his" data to the patients' PHR in anticipation of the pa-
tient's next encounter with a health care provider?
PHRs create their own share of legal indeterminacies. As
PHR data becomes a major predicate for CDHC (patients mak-
ing decisions on the basis of cost taking into account their own
data set), will that decrease provider liability or open up new
allegations of negligent behavior by providers? For example,
will the standard of care be adjusted to reflect physician reli-
ance on PHR data?
IV. INCREASED PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND SECURITY RISKS
At first sight, and particularly if you agree philosophically
with CDHC, PHRs seem to offer some real advantages over a
national EHR system. They seem to avoid the financing chal-
lenges of EHRs (being both technically more modest and less
victimized by market failures) while providing an end-run
around patient and physician concerns about the privacy, con-
fidentiality, and security of electronic records. Indeed, as
noted above, the Markle Foundation has described PHRs as"private and secure.""' In this section I argue that the privacy
79. Nicolas Terry, What's Wrong with Health Privacy?, in LAW AND BIOETHICS 68, 73 (Sandra
H. Johnson, Ana S. Iltis & Barbara A. Hinze eds., Routledge, 2008) [hereinafter What's Wrong
with Health Privacy].
80. PERSONAL HEALTH WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 4.
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and security benefits of PHRs are largely illusory and that the
PCS legal protections are considerably less robust than those
for the EHR (which itself poses severe problems).
A. Medical Data at Risk?
Press stories about data breaches involving medical informa-
tion are legion. 1 Perhaps none is more famous than the Vet-
eran's Administration's (VA) misplacement of the unencrypt-
ed names, birthdates, and Social Security numbers of 19.6 mil-
lion to 26.5 million veterans contained on a laptop stolen from
a VA employee's home.8 2 A recent study by a privacy advo-
cacy group pointed to 291 publicly reported data breaches in-
volving personal health information in the period between the
effective date of the HIPAA privacy rule (April 2003) and the
end of 2007.83 These breaches potentially exposed the medical
data of more than 16 million individuals.84
B. PHR Data at Risk?
If PHRs are created and managed by patients themselves,
how can they be at PCS risk? Certainly, there would seem to
be few privacy and confidentiality risks if the data is stored on
the patient's home computer. There may be security risks if
the patient's computer is hacked or the patient loses the USB
drive to which he has exported his unencrypted data, but
these are hardly issues peculiar to medical information or fer-
tile ground for legal intervention.
Considerably more risks arise if the patient is using a web-
based PHR service because the patient no longer has physical
control over the data.85 What guarantees does the patient have
81. See, e.g., Ensuring Privacy, supra note 12, at 684 n.7. There is even a web site now de-
voted to chronicling data breaches (only some of which relate to medical information). Pri-
vacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, http://www.privacyrights.org/
ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited May 17, 2009).
82. See Christopher Lee, VA Knew Early About Data Theft, Officials Did Not Tell Secretary for
13 Days, Document Shows, WASH. POST, May 27, 2006, at A4, available at http://www. washing-
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/25/AR200605 2 50 1 2 37 .html.
83. POGoWASRIGHT.ORG, MEDICAL PRIVACY AT RISK: A CALL FOR EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION 3
(2007).
84. Id.




that the data is secure or that it will not be shared with third
parties? First, assume that the service provider has a prior re-
lationship with the patient; for example a health insurer, em-
ployer, or health care provider. What guarantees does the pa-
tient have that the data he or she enters will not be used to fur-
ther some other goal of the service purchaser, such as an
employer looking to promote only employees who are in well-
ness programs? Second, assume that the service provider has
no such relationship but seeks to monetize the information it
collects by selling the data it collects to advertisers (e.g., a
smoking cessation plan marketed to PHR subscribers who
check the "smoker" box).
Given their current low penetration of the records market, it
is impossible to gauge the type or level of PCS risks that PHRs
will incur.86 What we do know is that the pharmaceutical in-
dustry spends $25-$30 billion annually on marketing, more
than twice their expenditure on research and development.87
With such large stakes in play it seems reasonable to assume
that data aggregators and data mining services will be inter-
ested in having some access to PHR data and that the provid-
ers of PHR services will be interested in creating a revenue
stream from either providing the data directly, or leveraging it
to encourage targeted DTC (direct-to-consumer) advertising
by drug companies.
Finally, an obvious factual circumstance must be addressed;
one that at the very least will confuse patients attempting to
comprehend the legal protection of their PHR data. In the
words of a 2007 study performed for The Office of the Na-
tional Coordinator for Health Information Technology
(ONCHIT):88
What we do note is that PHRs contain much of the
same information covered by HIPAA, even if the PHR
vendor is not itself a HIPAA-covered entity. It would
appear to be an inconsistency in the legal framework to
86. CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., SNAPSHOT, THE STATE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN CALIFORNIA 21 (2008), available at http://www.chcf.org/documents/
chronicdisease/ HITSnapshotO8.pdf (noting only two percent of Californian consumers cur-
rently use PHRs and fifty-seven percent were "not at all interested" in accessing PHRs online).
87. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 (D.N.H. 2007), rev'd, No. 07-1945,
2008 WL 4911262 (1st Cir. Nov. 18, 2008).
88. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Off. of National Coordinator: Mission,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/onc/mission (last visited May 17, 2009).
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have rigid restrictions on, for example, the secondary
use of data by some kinds of PHR vendors but not oth-
ers.8
9
If the PHR data remains in its patient-controlled silo and is
never shared, PCS legal issues will seldom arise. But, as soon
as the patient shares the data, very different legal regimes may
apply to that data going forward. Thus, a single piece of data
may have very different PCS legal properties depending on
whether it is exported to (shared with) a HIPAA-regulated
provider or a different kind of third party such as a health in-
formation web site, or again if it is shared back (re-imported)
to the patient-maintained PHR.9'
C. Deficiencies in Legal PCS Models
Our current legal model for protecting medical information
rotates around regulatory requirements for confidentiality and
security. Confidentiality rules limit access to previously dis-
closed patient data, while security requirements provide the
correlate, seeking to restrict unauthorized access to those not
within the circle of confidence. This model generally eschews
privacy requirements in that it tends not to place any restric-
tions on the collection of medical data.
The deficiencies with our legal confidentiality and security
models primarily lie in their execution. As described else-
where, the federal HIPAA confidentiality code rules (misla-
beled as protective of "privacy") are conceptually and opera-
tionally defective. First, rather than clearly establishing the
89. ALTARUM, INC., REVIEW OF THE PERSONAL HEALTH RECORD (PHR) SERVICE PROVIDER
MARKET, PRIVACY AND SECURITY 14 (2007), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
healthit/ahic/materials/ 01_07/ce/PrivacyReview.pdf [hereinafter 2007 ONCHIT Study] (re-
port prepared by ALTARUM, Inc. for ONCHIT).
90. This state of affairs seems to be recognized by the Google Health privacy policy:
Some of these third-party websites will be covered by federal and state health
privacy laws (such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, or
"HIPAA"), and those laws will govern how they may use and share your informa-
tion. As a result, you must authorize these providers to send information to your
Google Health account. With that authorization, you also give them permission to
send certain types of health information (such as mental health records) that are pro-
tected by federal and state laws and require special authorization. When you ask
Google to send your health information to others, you will also be giving Google
permission to send those certain types of health information.
Google Health, Google Health Privacy Policy, http://www.google.com/health/html/priva-
cy.html (last visited May 17, 2009).
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principle of confidentiality and patient rights, the regulation
concentrates on exceptionalism -cataloging the process of pa-
tient consent to disclosure. Second, these recognized excep-
tions are quite broad, permitting disclosure of patient data to
public health, judicial, and regulatory interests that likely
would exceed patient expectations. 9' Third, in an environment
where so many "outsiders" such as pharmaceutical companies
and data aggregators covet medical data, the regulatory stan-
dards have only limited protections against the use of patient
data outside of treatment and billing. Fourth, there are con-
siderable concerns about the enforcement of the regulations
even as they stand.92 Fifth, it is an understatement to say that
the confidentiality code lacks transparency or clarity and that
it fails to send any principled or educational "message" to pa-
tients as to their data rights.93 Sixth, considerable doubts have
been raised as to the level of the federal government's com-
mitment to the enforcement of the HIPAA rules.94
Of all the general criticisms that can be leveled at the federal
confidentiality code, however, there is one that is particularly
glaring in the context of PHRs. There are serious gaps in the
regulations (a function of limitations in the enabling legisla-
tion) that will result in HIPAA protections not reaching data
held in most PHRs. Truly, most PHRs will exist in a PCS regu-
lation-free zone because the "privacy" (confidentiality) and se-
curity rules apply only to health plans, health care clearing-
houses, or health care providers95 who engage in HIPAA elec-
tronic transactions. 96 As a result, non-traditional custodians of
medical data will not be subject to the regulations.9" Some
91. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2007); see also Kalinoski v. Evans, 377 F. Supp. 2d 136, 139 (D.D.C.
2005) (citing § 164.512).
92. There is also generalized laxness, as HIPAA compliance declines. See Nancy Ferris,
Privacy Rule Compliance Said to Be Diminishing, GOVERNMENT HEALTH IT, Apr. 19, 2006, http://
www.govhealthit.com/online/news/94120-.html.
93. Ensuring Privacy, supra note 12, at 713-17; see also What's Wrong with Health Privacy, su-
pra note 79.
94. See, e.g., Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines, Lax Enforcement Puts Patients' Files
at Risk, Critics Say, WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, at A01.
95. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.502 (2007).
96. 45 C.F.R. § 164.104 (2007). For an explanation of HIPAA transactions, see Nicolas P.
Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Privacy Regulation on Medical Error and Malpractice Liti-
gation, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 365-66 (2001).
97. See Beard v. City of Chicago, No. 03 C 3527, 2005 WL 66074, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10,
2005) (holding city fire department is not a covered entity under HIPAA); see also United
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PHRs may be included; for example, PHRs provided by doc-
tors, hospitals, or health plans generally will be swept into the
HIPAA ambit. Further, some "branded" PHRs supplied by
third parties at the behest of covered entities may be subject to
the "business associate" extension.98 However, PHRs supplied
by employers, non-health (e.g., life) insurers, and third party,
web-based PHRs generally will avoid HIPAA regulation. 9
If the federal regulations are inapplicable, will state laws
protect PHR data? The HIPAA confidentiality code does not
preempt "more stringent" state law,100 and most states have
some form of PCS legislation that protects medical information
against disclosure.'' Although state law is not hidebound by
the limitations of HIPAA applicability, few are sufficiently
comprehensive to include PHRs.'0 2
At the very least PHRs engender complex legal indetermi-
nacies as to the application of federal and state protections.
Potentially, PHR suppliers will be able to exploit their HIPAA-
free space and externalize many of the PCS risks inherent in
their products and services to patients. A 2007 study prepared
for ONCHIT posed the following questions:
- Should the consumer be informed every time there is
any secondary use of the data, for example sale of ag-
gregated data to a pharmacy benefits manager for
utilization review?
States v. Mathis, 377 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (M.D. Tenn. 2005) (holding FBI not a covered entity).
98. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.504(e) (2007).
99. See generally Assoc. Press, Google Online Health Records Service Irks Privacy Watchdogs,
Fox NEWS, May 20, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,356663,00.html (stating
that Google Health and similar services are not covered by HIPAA). In this context, 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.103 (2007) may apply to exclude employers who are otherwise covered entities if the
data is viewed as contained in employment records.
100. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.202-160.203 (2007).
101. Of course most states also recognize the common law action for breach of confidence.
See generally Ensuring Privacy, supra note 12, at 712-13 (discussing torts-based cause of action
for breach of confidence under common law).
102. California and Washington State have exceptional protections. See CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.81.5 (West Supp. 2008) (including medical information as protected personal information
under state law. Medical information is defined as "any individually identifiable information,
in electronic or physical form, regarding the individual's medical history or medical treatment
or diagnosis by a health care professional." (emphasis added). This definition is sufficiently
comprehensive to include PHRs.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.215.010, 19.215.020 (West
2007) (including information that "relates to medical history or status" in the definition of
"personal financial" and "health information." Also, providing for a civil action for careless
disposal of such information.).
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* Should all current third-party users of de-identified
or individually identifiable data be explicitly named by
the PHR vendor?
* Should the consumer be required to explicitly opt-in
prior to any transfer or sale of individually identifiable
PHR data?
* Should the vendor be required to notify all consum-
ers of any change in privacy policy? Should a written
copy of the privacy policy be mailed to every PHR cus-
tomer on a periodic basis, as is required for consumer
credit?
* Should vendors be required to notify all affected
consumers in the event of an accidental privacy
breach? What if that breach takes place in a business
partner, an Application Service Provider (ASP) vendor,
or other third party? Must the data involved in the
breach be provided to consumers affected?
* Should a history of the vendor's privacy breaches,
accidental disclosures, or other unauthorized access or
viewing of PHR data be provided to all PHR consum-
ers, perhaps on demand?
* Should a seal of approval or other privacy certifica-
tion or audit of privacy policies be developed, and
provided by a non-profit consortium, government
agency, or for-profit firm?
* Should all vendors be required to be able to docu-
ment their chain-of-custody process for all PHR data
they may hold, perhaps for audit or other investigatory
purposes?
* Should all PHR vendors be covered under HIPAA?'0 3
In the next section, I examine potential legal vehicles with
which to address some of these difficult questions.
103. 2007 ONCHIT Study, supra note 89, at 16.
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V. ADDRESSING THE PHR PRIVACY-CONFIDENTIALITY-SECURITY
ISSUES
Given the limited applicability of traditional PCS legal pro-
tections to PHRs, is it possible to harness some less well-
known or even less formally legalistic approaches? This sec-
tion critically examines some potential alternatives such as se-
curity breach notification, privacy policies, and voluntary
compliance with HIPAA. With seeming inevitability it con-
cludes by once again addressing the reform of HIPAA itself.
A. Breach Notification Statutes
The HIPAA security rule while imposing related duties such
as system audits1"4 does not require notification of breach.
Some state codes (apparent Security Rule preemption notwith-
standing" 5) do impose medical records-specific requirements
as to recording information disclosures. 6
Primarily aimed at financial identity theft, a security breach
notification law is a relatively new construct that has joined
the PCS legal constellation. California passed the first such
statute, which became effective in July 2003."7 More than forty
states now have some type of breach notification statute.
There are many flavors of this type of legislation with different
advantages and disadvantages.' 9 The basic model, however,
is to create some threshold (e.g., a reasonable belief in the data
custodian that the data has been acquired by a third party or,
alternatively, a reasonable belief that it has been acquired and
104. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(b) (2007).
105. See 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8362 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160) (discussing
preemption).
106. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.057(12) (West 2007) ("Records owners are responsible
for maintaining a record of all disclosures of information contained in the medical record to a
third party, including the purpose of the disclosure request. The record of disclosure may be
maintained in the medical record. The third party to whom information is disclosed is pro-
hibited from further disclosing any information in the medical record without the expressed
written consent of the patient or the patient's legal representative.").
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West Supp. 2009).
108. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification Laws,
http://www.ncsi.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited May 17, 2009).
109. Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 913, 915-18 (2007) (discussing and distinguishing "the different aspects of breach noti-
fication and identify[ing] trade-offs that arise when a notification approach emphasizes one or
another").
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misused) that triggers a duty to notify the consumer and, in
some jurisdictions, other interested parties such as consumer
protection agencies or credit reporting agencies (frequently
also triggering a security "freeze" on the consumer's file).' 0
Not surprisingly, this explosion of diverse state provisions af-
fecting nationwide data custodians has led to calls for a fed-
eral, preemptive measure. For example, the Identity Theft
Prevention Act..' would require data custodians to have writ-
ten security programs and notify the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), credit-reporting agencies, and affected individuals
of security breaches involving "sensitive personal informa-
tion," and facilitate freezes on credit reports. At the beginning
of 2008 there were nine, often conflicting bills before the 110th
Conress, bottled up in various House and Senate conmmit-
tees.
Thefts of medical identity represent only three percent of
identity theft but there are concerns that it is on the rise.' A
review of the state breach statutes shows considerable incon-
sistency regarding the treatment of medical data breaches.
There are at least three extant models. In the first model, state
breach notification statutes, while not explicitly excluding
medical data, appear not to be applicable because of the rela-
tively narrow types of data they protect (such as driver's li-
cense and social security numbers and financial informa-
tion)." '4 This is also the case with the federal initiatives. For
110. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3571.1(H)(4)-(5) (Supp. 2008) (consumer may request
"freeze" in case of identity theft); H.B. 2245, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §3(C) (Okla. 2008) (con-
sumer shall be notified "as soon as practicable following discovery, if the personal informa-
tion was or if the entity reasonably believes was accessed and acquired by an unauthorized
person").
11. Identity Theft Prevention Act, S. 1178, 110th Cong. (2007).
112. Alexei Alexis, Outlook 2008: Data Security, Murky Outlook Seen for Federal Date Breach
Notification Legislation in 2008, PRIVACY LAW WATCH (BNA), Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.bna.
com/products/ip/pwdm.htm (sign in to subscription service; then search "Murky Outlook
Seen for Federal Date Breach Notification Legislation in 2008").
113. Michelle Andrews, Medical Identity Theft Turns Patients Into Victims, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Feb. 29, 2008, http://health.usnews.com/articles/health/living-well-usn/
2008/02/29/medical-identity-theft-turns-patients-into-victims.html.
114. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716 (West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. §
36a-701(b) (West Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 12B-101 to -104 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 817.5681 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 to -912 (West Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 28-51-104 to -107 (2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 530/5, /10, /12, /20 (West
2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.9-2-10, 24-4.9-3-1 to -4, 24-4.9-4-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 to-7a02 (Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1347-
49 (Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61 (West Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-
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example, the Identity Theft Prevention Act definition of "sen-
sitive personal information" does not extend to medical
data.'15 The second model is to explicitly include medical in-
formation or health insurance data, thus extending breach no-
tifications to cases of medical identity theft but to exclude cus-
todians who are HIPAA "covered entities." 116 A third model
applies the state statute generally to medical information, but
excludes data custodians subject to and in compliance with
HIPAA.17
Unsurprisingly, given its subject matter, but unlike most
state or proposed federal breach notification laws, the TRUST
in Health Information Act of 2008"8 would have required
medical data stewards or processors to notify individuals of
security breaches. Therein, a "health information person," de-
fined sufficiently broadly so as to include most PHR service
providers, 119 would have been under a duty to notify indi-
viduals of security breaches involving personal health infor-
mation within fifteen days of the discovery of the breach.
21
The HITECH Act of 2009, passed as a part of the stimulus bill
adds its own version of a breach notification provision, as dis-
cussed below. 121
1704 (2007); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa (Consol. Supp. 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1347.12, 1349.19, 1349.191-.192 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 48.002, .103, .201 (Vernon Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-44-102, -201, -202, -301
(Supp. 2008).
115. S. 1178.
116. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501(J)(2) (Supp. 2008); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.81.5e)(3) (West Supp. 2008); see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2008) (which seems limited in its scope so as to apply to financial information and iden-
tifiers, § 14-3501(d)(1), but explicitly excludes "Information that is disseminated or listed in
accordance with the [HIPAA]." § 14-3501(d)(2)(iii). Presumably this would therefore exclude
financial information contained in HIPAA records.).
117. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-2(g)(2) (Supp. 2007), amended by S.B. 2402, 24th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008) (deeming a business in compliance with the notification statute if it is
"Any health plan or healthcare provider that is subject to and in compliance with the stan-
dards for privacy or individually identifiable health information and the security standards
for the protection of electronic health information of [HIPAA]."); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 445.72(10) (West Supp. 2008) (deeming compliance with breach notification statute if a
"person or agency ... is subject to and complies with the [HIPAA] . . . for the prevention of
unauthorized access to customer information and customer notice"); S.B. 583, 74th Or. Leg.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (deeming compliance with breach notification statute if a "per-
son... is subject to and complies with regulations implementing the [HIPAA]").
118. TRUST in Health Information Act of 2008, H.R. 5442, 110th Cong. (2008).
119. Id.§171(13).
120. Id. § 113.
12 1. See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
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Assume, therefore, that a comprehensive breach notification
duty was imposed on PHR data custodians. What would be
its value? Credit reporting freezes and records corrections du-
ties may reduce the impact of financial identity theft, but
would notification to a patient that his medical data has been
compromised have a similar ameliorative effect? In the medi-
cal records context there seems to be only indirect value (such
as identifying a PCS defendant) in telling the patient that the
barn door has been open and the horse has bolted.
B. Privacy Policies
As I have argued elsewhere, non-governmental regulatory
models for health care-related web services, such as codes of
conduct and privacy policies, have had a generally unsatisfac-
tory history.'2 Even assuming that they were beneficial (or
even read by consumers'23 ), however, Internet privacy policies
have little relevance to the PHR security, confidentiality, and
privacy issues discussed herein.'24 Privacy models and poli-
cies promulgated by well-known organizations such as
TRUSTe'25 are aimed at ancillary data collection and process-
ing by web sites that request personal information or use
tracking cookies or GIF "Bugs." While PHR web applications
122. Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions Sans Fronti~res (or How I Stopped Worrying About Viagra
on the Web but Grew Concerned About the Future of Healthcare Delivery), 4 YALE J. OF HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHIcS 183, 239-46 (2004); Nicolas P. Terry, Rating the 'Raters': Legal Exposure of
Trustmark Authorities in the Context of Consumer Health Informatics, 2 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e18
(2000), available at http://www.jmir.org/2000/3/el8/HTML.
123. Press Release, TRUSTe, Consumers Have False Sense of Security About Online Pri-
vacy-Actions Inconsistent with Attitudes (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.truste.org/about/
pressrelease/12_06_06.php (noting that, of the consumers who provide personal information
to a web site for the first time, 72% failed to check "most of the time" whether the site has a
privacy policy, and that 80% failed to read the policy if provided).
124. See also 2007 ONCHIT Study, supra note 89, at 10 ("There appears to be some confusion
here by vendors, who describe Internet privacy policies for information collected by interac-
tion with the Web site (cookies, Web logs) rather than privacy policies for the PHR data, how-
ever collected.").
125. The TRUSTe Home Page, suggests privacy policy language, inspects sites prior to au-
thorizing them to use its trustmark, and provides some dispute resolution services. TRUSTe
does not mandate the specifics of a privacy policy (e.g., any requirement that the site not share
data with others), but rather suggests various alternative statements. See generally TRUSTE,
GUIDANCE ON MODEL WEB SITE DISCLOSURES 2-9, http://www.truste.org/docs/
ModelPrivacyPolicyDisclosures.doc (last visited May 17, 2009) (for example, "We share
aggregated demographic information about our user base with our partners and advertisers.
This information does not identify individual users.").
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may not be immune from this kind of surreptitious data acqui-
sition, the core purpose of the PHR business relationship is the
storage and processing of the patient's identifiable health in-
formation. Most existing privacy policy models are therefore
irrelevant or of limited value.
So, what would an industrial strength PHR privacy policy
require? A 2007 ONCHIT study of the privacy policies of
thirty PHRs constructed a baseline of thirty-one areas that a
PHR privacy policy should address, from issues such as read-
ability (what would happen to the data if the vendor went out
of business) to data gathering and sharing. 126 The study found
that ninety-seven percent of the policies surveyed addressed
fifteen or fewer of those issues. 12' As an example, only one of
the thirty privacy policies included a statement that explicit
patient consent was necessary prior to the vendor sharing data
stored in a PHR.'28
The fatal flaw of the privacy policy model is that web sites
can avoid legal jeopardy by not posting a policy, or using one
that is so rudimentary that it provides no real protection for
users. While several states have enacted a privacy policy
129
and other privacy protections 3 ' for their own official sites,
very few jurisdictions have addressed the question of com-
mercial web sites.' 3' Indeed, only California has anything
more than a rudimentary model, requiring web sites to "con-
spicuously post [a] privacy policy,"' that identifies "the cate-
gories of personally identifiable information that the operator
collects and the categories of third-party persons or entities
with whom the operator may share that personally identifiable
information."'33 It is this California law that has engaged the
126. 2007 ONCHIT Study, supra note 89, at 4-13.
127. Id. at 6.
128. Id. at 7.
129. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-2-40 (2007) (requiring privacy policy).
130. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 177/10 (2008) (prohibiting tracking cookies).
131. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-302(a)(14) (2006) (making it a deceptive trade practice to
knowingly make "a false or misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on the Inter-
net"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4107(a)(10) (2008) (making it a deceptive or fraudulent business
practice to knowingly make "a false or misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on
the Internet").
132. CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a) (West 2008).
133. Id. at § 22575(b)(1). "Personally identifiable information" is defined to include
"[i]nformation concerning a user that the Web site or online service collects online from the
user and maintains in personally identifiable form in combination with an identifier...." Id. §
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blogosphere in a debate about whether Google was in compli-
ance when it refused to link its privacy policy from its tradi-
tionally "clean" front page;34 a question that has added impor-
tance given Google's entrance into the PHR market. The
TRUST in Health Information Act of 2008 would require a
"health information person" such as a PHR provider to pub-
lish a written privacy policy.'35 This policy would have to in-
clude a detailed description of the data subject's rights includ-
ing various consent and opt-out rights.
Assume, however, that a web site does post a more granular
privacy policy that addresses issues specific to PHR data.
What is the legal effect? For example, Google Health states:
1. You control who can access your personal health in-
formation. By default, you are the only user who can
view and edit your information. If you choose to, you
can share your information with others.
2. Google will not sell, rent, or share your information
(identified or de-identified) without your explicit con-
sent, except in the limited situations described in the
Google Privacy Policy, such as when Google believes it
is required to do so by law. 36
Another web vendor addresses specifically the question of
the patient-employees data privacy vis-A-vis a sponsoring em-
ployer: "If your.., service is provided by your employer, that
employer acts as a sponsor. Under no circumstances will your
confidential medical data be made accessible or sold to your
employer."'37
In either case, the breach of such a policy could trigger con-
tractual remedies, while the policy language likely would feed
the expectations upon which a patient could build a breach of
22577(a)(7).
134. Posting of Saul Hansell to Bits, Is Google Violating a California Privacy Law?, http://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/30/is-google-violating-a-california-privacy-law/ (May 30,
2008, 08:45 EST). On July 3, 2008, Google added such a link. See Posting of Saul Hansell to
Bits, Google Changes Home Page, Adding Link to Privacy Policy, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
(Search for "California Privacy Law") (July 4, 2008, 10:07 EST).
135. TRUST in Health Information Act of 2008, H.R. 5442, 110th Cong. § 111 (2008).
136. Google Health Privacy Policy, http://www.google.com/health/html/privacy.htm
(last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
137. Securamed, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.securamed.com/support-eng-
lish.med (last visited Dec. 16, 2008) ("What role does my employer play?").
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confidence action. More importantly, the PHR provider
would be subject to action by consumer protection agencies
such as the FTC.138 Under the TRUST in Health Information
Act of 2008, breach of the requirement of a privacy policy or of
a required data subject right contained therein could lead to
federal civil penalties, private actions, or state attorney general
enforcement.139
The ONCHIT study suggested several important features for
any PHR privacy policy, including "complete transparency on
the release of PHR data to any third-party," disclosure of "all
business relationships relating to the handling, processing,
data mining, or other management of PHR data," and descrip-
tions of "the relationship of the vendor's policies to HIPAA
requirements ... and other relevant Federal rules and regula-
tions." 140 Not surprisingly, given that the Achilles' heel of the
PHR construct is its inchoate interoperability with third par-
ties (whether by import or export of data), one of the funda-
mental flaws in current privacy policies concerns third party
relationships. Again, take the Google Health policy regarding
data that a patient shares with a third party, Google partner:
2. Google Health contains a directory of third-party
websites that are capable of securely sending informa-
tion to Google Health. These websites (which may in-
clude your medical provider) may give more informa-
tion about certain conditions or extend the functional-
ity of Google Health in other ways. By creating a link
to these websites, you give them permission to send
you information such as medical records, prescription
histories, or test reports.
3. You can approve access for some of these websites to
view your health information. If a website accesses
138. See generally Fed. Trade Comm'n, Enforcing Privacy Promises: Section 5 of the FTC
Act, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises.htm (last visited May 17,
2009) (discussing Commission's practice of enforcing privacy policies and challenging com-
pany practices that cause substantial consumer injury); Complaint and Request for Injunction,
Request for Investigation and for Other Relief Before the Federal Trade Commission, In re
Ask.com, filed Jan. 19, 2008, available at http://epic.org/privacy/ask/epic askeraser011908.
pdf (arguing that defendant's representations as to the persistence of personal data when us-
ing their web search service "AskEraser" constitute deceptive and misleading practice).
139. H.R. 5442 §§ 151-52.
140. 2007 ONCHIT Study, supra note 89, at 15.
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your health information and stores a copy of your in-
formation, that copy will be governed by that website's
privacy policy. Others at that facility-like an on-call
doctor-may be able to view your information. Google
is not responsible for the content, performance, or pri-
vacy policies of third-party websites.
5. All third-party websites listed in the directory are
contractually required to abide by the Google Health
Developer Policies, which establish strict privacy stan-
dards for how they collect, use, or share your informa-
tion. 141
This welcome transparency from a leading and well-
respected internet provider poses more questions than it an-
swers. Clearly, most partners of a PHR provider will have
compelling commercial incentives to comply with the privacy
policies contained in a development agreement. However,
even leaving aside any privity questions, this contractual con-
struct falls short of even the often-criticized HIPAA "Business
associate" extension.
142
Overall, however, the privacy policy approach to dealing
with PHR PCS issues is at best immature. In the absence of
the PHR vendors agreeing to a granular, standardized privacy
policy (including but not limited to voluntary compliance with
HIPAA standards) the approach will remain incoherent.
C. HIPAA as Guideline?
Closely related (functionally and legally) to increased use of
privacy policies is the proposal that PHR vendors voluntarily
comply with HIPAA. The ONCHIT study of PHR privacy
policies found that only twenty-six percent of vendors even
referenced HIPAA standards.143 The study's authors noted:
We would have expected more vendors to at least ref-
erence HIPAA .... Since the legal landscape is so un-
141. Google Health Privacy Policy, supra note 135.
142. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e). Cf H.R. 5442 § 114(a)-(b) (providing for enhanced transparency
regarding data partners).
143. 2007 ONCHIT Study, supra note 89, at 12.
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clear on the privacy requirements of PHR service pro-
viders, it would make sense that many of them would
use HIPAA as a guideline in formulating their policies.
In addition there could be significant marketing advan-
tages from referencing HIPAA, as many users, provid-
ers and payers are familiar with it.'44
Leaving aside the doubtful assertion that "many users" are
familiar with the intricacies of the HIPAA PCS construct and
the many flaws in HIPAA already discussed, 145 what would
voluntary compliance with HIPAA provisions do to further
PHR PCS? Certainly, co-opting the Administrative, 46 Physi-
cal, 147 and Technical Safeguards 148 contained within the Secu-
rity Rule would be positive. However, the terrain is less cer-
tain with regard to confidentiality. Distilled to a single princi-
ple (not an easy task) the HIPAA code requires health care
providers to limit unauthorized disclosures of patient informa-
tion to those involved in health care and billing. Yet, that pre-
supposes a fundamentally different relationship from the one
between a patient and a PHR provider.
The HIPAA rules assume that the regulated entities, some
"Business associates " "' aside, are health care providers. For
example, providers have been told that the discretion inherent
in many of HIPAA's "permitted uses" 150 is to be exercised with
"professional ethics and best judgment."15 1 Further, for several
of its rules the HIPAA code assumes that the data custodian
can differentiate between ordinary medical records and "Psy-
chotherapy notes."152
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
146. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308 (2007).
147. Id. § 164.310.
148. Id. § 164.312.
149. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2007) (defining "Business associate"); 45 C.F.R. §
164.502(e) (2007) (disclosures to business associates), 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2007) (business as-
sociate contracts); 45 C.F.R. § 164.532(d) (2007) (effect of prior contracts or other arrangements
with business associates).
150. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.512, 164.514 (2007).
151. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, UNITED STATES DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 4-5 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/ privacy/ hipaa/ understanding/ summary/ privacysummary.pdf. Nothing here suggests
that the better PHR providers do not have ethics or best judgment, but these are derived from
quite different core IT competencies and processes.
152. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2007) (defining "Psychotherapy notes"), 45 C.F.R. §
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Several other points of disconnection can be observed. Take
just one: HIPAA permits unfettered use of de-identified
data.'53 It is at least arguable that patients do not object to
health care providers sharing de-identified data as a public
good, but their altruism may not extend to PHR vendors,
whom they are directly paying to store their records, when
they seek to monetize them.
This disconnect continues in the area of enforcement.
HIPAA lacks a private right of action and its enforcement
powers are vested in a regulatory office within the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services's (DHHS) Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) that specializes in dealing with traditional health
care entities.' If OCR were to investigate a PCS claim and
find a breach by a PHR vendor what would be the remedy?
Even if vendors voluntarily complied with HIPAA require-
ments how could that open them up to civil money'55 or crimi-
nal penalties'56 under a statute that on its face does not include
them?
If an external normative structure is suggested as the basis
for voluntary compliance, it might be preferable to look at
some of the state statutory medical privacy models. For ex-
ample, California's Confidentiality of Medical Information
Act, 57 while based on a premise similar to HIPAA's (confiden-
tiality of medical information collected by health care provid-
ers58), is unencumbered by many of the limitations of applica-
bility in the HIPAA statute and extends to:
[a]ny business organized for the purpose of maintain-
ing medical information in order to make the informa-
tion available to an individual or to a provider of
health care at the request of the individual or a pro-
vider of health care, for purposes of allowing the indi-
164.508(a)(2) (2007) (stating generally "a covered entity must obtain an authorization for any
use or disclosure of psychotherapy notes").
153. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(d)(2), 164.514(a)-(b).
154. See United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights,
http://www.hhs. gov/ocr/office/index.html (last visited May 17, 2009).
155. 42 U.S.C. §1320d-5 (2007).
156. 42 U.S.C. §1320d-6 (2007).
157. Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56.07-37 (Deering
2007).
158. Id. § 56 note.
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vidual to manage his or her information.159
The substantive provisions, while suffering from some of the
same assumptions that the data custodian is typically a health
care provider, provide for more robust confidentiality protec-
tions"' and require a "contractor who creates, maintains, pre-
serves, stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical re-
cords shall do so in a manner that preserves the confidentiality
of the information contained therein." 61 Any such contractor"who negligently creates, maintains, preserves, stores, aban-
dons, destroys, or disposes of medical records" 62 is subject to
administrative and criminal penalties, 163 and a private right of
action by the patient. 1
64
D. Reforming HIPAA
The limitations inherent in notification of breach statutes,
privacy policies, and voluntary compliance with HIPAA, cou-
pled with a need for national standards applicable to some-
thing like border-agnostic web data, leads the discussion back
to a relatively unpalatable imperative-statutory reform of the
HIPAA code.
This is unpalatable because there is so little political will to
reopen the federal standards.'65 Lack of Congressional agree-
ment led to the development of the HIPAA transactional, pri-
vacy, and security standards being handed off to DHHS. Pro-
viders intensely dislike HIPAA protections, and privacy advo-
cates may be loath to reopen the discussion lest the fragile
protections of HIPAA are watered down. A "simple fix" to
the HIPAA PCS regulations, to extend their provisions to PHR
providers, would have the same flaws identified above in dis-
159. Id. § 56.06(a).
160. Id. § 56.10.
161. Id. §56.101.
162. Id.
163. Id. § 56.36.
164. Id. §§ 56.35-36.
165. Cf House Speaker Calls for EHRs in 2008 Health Policy Proposals, IHEALTHBEAT, Jan. 28,
2008, http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2008//28/House-Speaker-Calls-for-EHRs-in-
2008-Health-Policy-Proposals.aspx?topiclD=54 (quoting Speaker Pelosi, speaking in favor of
EHRs at a conference in January 2008, as saying "Essential to [improving health care through
EHRs], though, is protecting confidentiality and privacy. If we have the technology or if we
dcn't, we must [ask] for the technology to make that possible.").
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cussing voluntary compliance. 66 A lower-key solution, federal
legislation aimed specifically at PHRs, would be next to im-
possible to harmonize with the existing confidentiality code
because of the overlaps between provider records and PHRs.
Yet, what is the alternative? States are increasingly comfort-
able in once again legislating on medical data confidentiality
(in part because of HIPPA's "more stringent" limitation on
preemption) and identity theft issues. A heterogeneous
patchwork of state protections will return us to pre-HIPAA
times and dramatically increase barriers to crucial HIT initia-
tives. Indeed, this disconnect is at the core of the electronics
records PCS debate. One of the original impediments to a na-
tional EHR identified by the Bush Administration was lack of
uniformity requiring ONCHIT to, in the words of Dr. Brailer,
"[address] variations in privacy and security policies that can
hinder interoperability." 67 Advocates of the national EHR
translated this into replacing the HIPAA "floor," whereby
more stringent state privacy protections are not preempted,1 68
with a HIPAA "ceiling," tipping the balance away from pa-
tient PCS protections in order to facilitate the national EHR. 69
In a prior article, Leslie Francis and I took the opposite ap-
proach, calling for specific PCS-enhancing reforms to take into
account general deficiencies in the federal legal model and to
respond to the PCS challenges inherent in a national, interop-
erable EHR program. While supportive of a HIPAA ceiling
we advocated reforming HIPAA to considerably increase pa-
166. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
167. Activities of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology: Testi-
mony before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcomm. on Technology, Inno-
vation, and Competitiveness, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of David J. Brailer, M.D., Ph.D., Na-
tional Coordinator for Health Information Technology, U.S. Department of Health and Hu-
man Services), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t05630a.html [hereinafter Brailer
Testimony].
168. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.202-.203 (2007).
169. See, e.g., BRUCE MERLIN FRIED, CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, GAUGING THE
PROGRESS OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INMATIVE: PERSPECTIVES
FROM THE FIELD 12 (2008), available at http://www.chcf.org/documents/chronicdisease/
GaugingTheProgressOfTheNationalHlTInitiative.pdf [hereinafter GAUGING THE PROGRESS]
(quoting Jeffrey Kang, M.D., chief medical officer for Cigna, on providing a chronology of the
Nationwide Health Information Structure: "Typically, [the federal authorities] set a minimum
and then states can go higher. On this one, in order for the free flow of information to im-
prove quality, you actually want to set a maximum which states can't go above because you
want to be able to guarantee some level of free flow.").
2009]
DREXEL LA W RE VIEW
tient PCS protections. 7 ° These same reforms should be ex-
tended to PHR models. Thus, some types of data (for example
prescription data) should be protected against even consented-
to collection or disclosure to commercial entities; health care
information should reside only in the medical domain; and an
independent regulatory body should be appointed that will
have the power to review the manner in which patient infor-
mation is managed, to create codes of conduct, and to resolve
disputes. At the very least, the limitations on HIPAA applica-
bility must be removed. The last vestiges of HHS's "insider
baseball" model, whereby HIPAA protections apply only to
traditional healthcare providers and their close business part-
ners, must be shed and replaced by a general federal medical
privacy code that does not turn on provider minutiae, but fo-
cuses on the data itself.
Taking an approach that is perhaps attuned to the current
political and legislative realities that apply to the data protec-
tion debate, the National Committee on Vital and Health Sta-
tistics (NCVHS)"'7 in its Stewardship Framework'72 report, sug-
gested tweaks to the HIPAA model, calling for stronger guid-
ance, strengthening of business agreements and their parties'
expectations, and calling on the FTC to increase its footprint in
non-HIPAA regulated areas (such as PHRs). However,
NCVHS also recommended:
HHS should work with other federal agencies and the
Congress ... for more inclusive, federal privacy legislation
so that all individuals and organizations that use and
disclose individually identifiable health information
are covered by the data stewardship principles inher-
ent in such legislation, including a range of organiza-
tions not currently covered by HIPAA. 73
In Europe, the Data Directive provides a data protection
model that imposes robust obligations on data stewards and
170. Ensuring Privacy, supra note 12, at 730-35.
171. Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, http://ncvhs.hhs. gov/ (last visited May
17, 2008).
172. NAT'L COMM. ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, REPORT ON ENHANCED PROTECTIONS
FOR USES OF HEALTH DATA: A STEWARDSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR "SECONDARY USES" OF
ELECTRONICALLY COLLECTED AND TRANSMITTED HEALTH DATA 16 (2007), available at
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/071221t.pdf.
173. Id. at 46.
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"chain of trust" data processors.'74 The foundation of this
model is a proportionality rule, 75 which applies equally to
both the collection and the disclosure of data, and limits the re-
processing of data for purposes incompatible with the original
purpose of collection.
Such basic principles must be at the core of reformed data
protection in the United States. Ensuring trust and meeting
patient expectations must drive the legislative process. Trust
must be earned by permitting patient opt-out or data seques-
tering, while expectations are consistent with relatively unim-
peded use of data for point of care and continuum of care
purposes. Patient acceptance of some secondary uses will be
more likely secured with strict limitations on commercial uses.
Between these extreme groupings, patient trust must be
earned through transparency as they are informed about the
projected uses of their data and its level of de-identification. 76
E. The Stimulus Package Compromise
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (or
Stimulus Bill) 7 passed by Congress and signed into law by
President Barack Obama in February 2009 includes $20 billion
for health information technologies. The core of the HIT pack-
174. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31-50 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML.
175. Id. at Ch. II, §1, Art. 6 (1)(c) ("adequate, relevant and not excessive").
176. Measured against these criteria, the proposed TRUST in Health Information Act of
2008, H.R. 5442, 110th Cong. (2008), is a disappointment. Although the reach of many of its
proposed PCS provisions is broader than those under HIPAA the bill retains some of
HIPAA's "insider baseball" approach. See H.R. 5442; HIPPA, supra note 14. Thus, although
privacy policy publication (§ 111), breach notification (§ 113), and data transparency (§ 114)
provisions apply equally to PHR providers (as "health information persons" as defined in §
171(13)) and traditional health care providers (§ 171(12)), this is not the case with regard to the
reformulated Subtitle C- Use and Disclosure of Personal Health Information (§§ 121-44). See H.R.
5442. That subtitle applies strengthened PCS provisions differently dependent upon whether
the data custodian is a health information person or a traditional provider. H.R. 5442. Not-
withstanding, the bill does display a considerable advance over HIPAA or related state stat-
utes, for example, in its approach to proportionality (§ 121(b)), tying data use to the purpose
for which it was disclosed (§ 121(c)), and an opt-out for network sharing of personal health in-
formation (§ 121(k)). See H.R. 5442. Consent processes for treatment or payment (§ 122) and
other uses (§ 123) are also strengthened. See H.R. 5442.
177. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).
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age is the stimulation of EMR adoption and the creation of re-
gional or nationwide interoperability for such records;178 the
ONCHIT Coordinator being instructed to adopt a strategy
leading to "[t]he utilization of an electronic health record for
each person in the United States by 2014." 179
The program includes funding for regional health informa-
tion exchanges and involves the largest incentive payments to
Medicaid and Medicare providers who adopt interoperable
EMRs. 18°
Title XIII of the Stimulus Bill is the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH).' 8 1 HITECH provides the operational structure and
regulatory authority for the HIT initiatives, such as govern-
ance, product certification, incentive programs, research, test-
ing, and reporting. Of particular note is Subtitle D of
HITECH, entitled "Privacy." 82 Subtitle D makes a number of
changes in the regulation of health information generally and
electronic health records in particular.
First, HITECH closes some of the regulatory gaps in HIPAA.
Thus, "Business associates" are no longer indirectly regulated
through terms in their contracts with "Covered Entities" but
are directly subject to the HIPAA code, 183 including its penal-
ties. 184 Second, HITECH seeks to respond to criticisms about
HIPAA's lack of an educative goal, requiring regulations on
educating health providers, 185 and an initiative to "enhance
public transparency regarding the uses of protected health in-
formation."' 6 Third, the new legislation requires new regula-
tions tightening up the idea of proportionality ("minimum
necessary" under HIPAA) in disclosures. 87 Fourth, there are
new restrictions on the use of protected health information for













marketing purposes,"' including a patient "opt-out" from
fundraising communications. 8 9 Fifth, there are new, tighter
definitions of breaches of the HIPAA code and provisions to
improve enforcement, 9 including enforcement through state
attorneys general.' 9' Although there is still no private right of
action, there will be a system designed to distribute a percent-
age of civil penalties or settlements collected from providers to
injured patients.192 In general, the HIPAA approach to pre-
emption, the HIPAA "floor," continues.' 93
Going substantially beyond the original HIPAA model,
HITECH adds a "breach notification" provision that applies to
covered entities'94 and their business associates.'95 These pro-
visions apply only to "unsecured protected health informa-
tion," '9' which, in the absence of further regulatory guid-
ance, 197 means "protected health information that is not se-
cured by a technology standard that renders protected health
information unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unau-
thorized individuals and is developed or endorsed by a stan-
dards developing organization that is accredited by the
American National Standards Institute." 
98
Given that the focus of this section of the stimulus package
was on promoting electronic health records by seeking to
counter current market failures, it is perhaps surprising that
HITECH contains little new regulation of privacy, confidenti-
ality, or security that is specific to EHR data. The statute does
include a definition of the EHR, although confusingly it is one












199. See §13400(5) ("The term 'electronic health record' means an electronic record of
health-related information on an individual that is created, gathered, managed, and consulted
by authorized health care clinicians and staff."). EHRs generally have been viewed as inher-
ently interoperable. Presumably the new standards for EHRs will lead to all EMRs having
that characteristic, thus rendering moot any distinction.
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federal law now has a definition of a PHR: "The term 'per-
sonal health record' means an electronic record of PHR identi-
fiable health information . . . on an individual that can be
drawn from multiple sources and that is managed, shared,
and controlled by or primarily for the individual."2 0
Regarding EHR data, HITECH requires enhanced "account-
ing of disclosure" regulations2"' and regulations that generally
will prohibit unconsented-to sale of EHR data.2 2 Regarding
PHRs, notably HITECH does not expand the definition of
"covered entity" to include those who hold PHR data. Never-
theless, those who do so because of relationships with "cov-
ered entities" will be subject to the new tighter controls over
disclosure and breach notification.2 3 Instead PHR data stew-
ards are subjected to a new "breach notification" provision. As
with the general breach provisions,2 4 this applies only to "un-
secured" data.20 5 Its reach is extended to a new species of
"Business associate," known as a "third party service provider
that provides services to a vendor of personal health re-
cords .... "206
Judgment as to the extent to which HITECH improves over-
all HIPAA protection of health data must be reserved (al-
though not without some optimism) until the new regulations
required to implement many, if not most, of its provisions are
drafted and the implicit enforcement renaissance is translated
into practice. Overall, however, and with the obvious excep-
tion of the breach notification provision (the efficacy of such a
model having been doubted above 20 ), PHRs remain in a rela-
tively unregulated state, with most data risks still shifted to
their data subjects.
VI. CONCLUSION
Technology is disruptive and tends to throw deficiencies in




203. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
205. § 13407(a).
206. § 13407(b).
207. See supra Part V.A.
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tion's commitment to a national interoperable health record
put focus on the fact that HIPAA was not limited to insider fi-
nancial transactions, but constituted the only national and
somewhat deficient protection for patient data. The roll-out of
PHR models continues this process. PHRs do much less than
EHRs, yet their health quality implications and PCS risks are
much greater.
The PHR narrative goes beyond innovation in e-health tech-
nologies and the development of new HIT business models. If
PHRs gain traction we will have created a second, privatized
channel of health care data that will lack the benefits of an
EHR system (completeness, quality, universal availability,
data-driven public health benefits, etc.). Whether or not PHRs
reach critical mass, they illustrate the practical and legal prob-
lems we face when we shift risks away from providers and
traditional payors to patients. PHRs, like the consumer-
directed health care they enable, avoid many of the market
failure issues that assault traditional health care models. Yet,
their ascent introduces legal indeterminacies as to both re-
cords' quality and PCS protections.
The existence of PCS regulation is not such an impediment to
EMR (or, by extension, health information technology) imple-
mentation that a PHR model enjoying a PCS regulation-free
zone is a rational option. Physicians and patients will embrace
both EMRs and PHRs when there is more not less PCS protec-
tion (and it will help if it is comprehensible). Any success en-
joyed by PHRs will be muted once patients realize such medi-
cal information storage is not adequately protected by the le-
gal system. EHRs and EMRs currently lack effective
penetration primarily because of classic healthcare financing
impediments. If, as seems likely, PHRs gain traction it will be
because they appear not to be constrained by such impedi-
ments. However, that apparent advantage will be negated
when patients realize that they now bear the costs and risks.
In the end, the success of both EHR and PHR models require
fundamental reform of our privacy, confidentiality, and secu-
rity approaches to medical information. Although it was not
without flaws, the TRUST in Health Information Act of 200828
suggested that comprehensive reform was still possible. In
208. H.R. 5442.
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early 2009, as the administration of President Obama began to
tackle a worsening economic crisis, considerable investment in
HIT was included in the initial federal stimulus package.
As the Obama Administration apparently has recognized,
sophisticated HIT systems are key to reducing error, improv-
ing quality, and reducing our runaway health costs. But for
those goals to be met, patients and providers must be willing,
empowered, and protected participants. 29  The personal
health record model, like its CDHC fellow traveler, must as-
pire to and deliver more than merely shifting additional risks
to patients.
209. See, e.g., GAUGING THE PROGRESS, supra note 168, at 12 ("It's not likely that state and
federal policy on data flow can be harmonized without addressing issues of privacy. Law-
makers at all levels and the public at large oppose the loss of personal privacy. If this policy
disconnect is to be addressed, a much broader public discussion must occur. Otherwise, clini-
cians and researchers will have difficulty gaining access to data they need to advance medical
care.").
[Vol. 1:216
